The Problem Of Divisional Play

Here are today's standings in the AL East: 

Baltimore Orioles (62-40) 
Tampa Bay Rays (62-43, 1.5 GB) 

Toronto Blue Jays (57-46, 5.5 GB) 

Boston Red Sox (55-47, 7.0 GB) 

New York Yankees (54-48, 8.0 GB) 

And here they are for the AL Central: 

Minnesota Twins (54-50) 

Cleveland Indians (51-51, 2.0 GB) 

Detroit Tigers (46-55, 6.5 GB) 

Chicago White Sox (41-62, 12.5 GB) 

Kansas City Royals (29-75, 25 GB) 

UGGGGGGGHHHHH.... 

The Yankees are a game better than the Twins. Why should the Twins have a distinctly better chance of making the postseason? It makes me want to throw something. 

Back before 1969, pennant races were decided by who won the most games in each league. The two league winners would then play each other in the World Series. There wasn't any interleague play or any other related nonsense; each team would play every other team in the same league the same number of times, so that each World Series representative truly represented the top team in each league. That's the way it should be. 

Relief Wins Are Pointless

    The DH complicates baseball a lot. And I mean A LOT. Instead of nine players starting each game, there are now ten, and two of them split duties. Originally, each player had two jobs: offense and defense. The pitcher had the most important job on the defensive side, and in order to specialize in pitching, most of them sacrificed their offense. This led to better pitching and better strategy, such as when to pull your pitcher and when to use a pinch hitter. Once they introduced the DH, the job of a pitcher became much different. No longer did the pitcher get to face his opponent on the mound. No longer did he have any say as to what happened on the offensive side. No longer did he have to do anything but pitch. With the introduction of the DH, pitchers ceased to be complete players. 

    I would argue that position players are more valuable to a baseball team than pitchers for one simple reason: Position players have control over how many runs their team scores, and can limit the other team's scoring. Pitchers used to be able to help their own cause, and some used to be above average hitters. Even when the pitcher is a weak hitter, he used to be able to help by playing small ball, like bunting and hit and run. Nowadays he only contributes on one side of the ball, while the fielders get to contribute on both. And DH's are certainly the least valuable players of all. Although pitchers are also one dimensional, they at least face the entire opposing lineup, while the DH makes up only 1/9 of the offense. 

    I play in a couple fantasy baseball leagues. One player has Colin Poche on his team, and refuses to let him go. Poche's pitching pretty well right now, but not amazing (2.19 ERA, 4.47 FIP). The main reason why he's so proud of Poche is because he has seven wins, more than many starters. Now he's only ten years old and I don't want to make him feel stupid, but I've tried to explain to him that relief wins are completely random. I never used wins as a be-all, end-all statistic for pitchers like some people do because wins are dependent on the offense as well as the defense. You could put up as many zeros as you want but if your offense doesn't score, you could never get a win. Back when pitchers used to hit, you could make a bit of an argument that pitchers' wins mattered. Although he was only 1/9 of the lineup, THE PITCHER HAD SOME SORT OF SAY ON WHAT THE OFFENSE PUT TOGETHER. If a reliever came into a losing game, put up three zeros and drove in a run, and came out the winning pitcher, I'd say that it was a well deserved relief win. Even now, you can make an argument for starters' wins because they can keep their team in the game for a long time by limiting the opposing offense for several innings. If you're a guy like Poche, who never goes more than one inning in a game and never bats, then who cares if you happened to be the pitcher of record when the offense decided to mount a comeback? It's not like you helped mount that comeback. That said, I do not care a lick for modern relief wins, and they should have no bearing on Hall of Fame debates. 

Pitch Clock

    In the 2022-23 offseason, MLB announced some new rule changes that would drastically affect the way the game was played. I've published about this subject before (https://thecooperstownadvocate.blogspot.com/2022/09/hes-complaining-again.html), and being a baseball purist, I can't say that I appreciate the new rules very much. However, out of all three major rule changes, one stands out as being the worst: the dreaded pitch clock. 

Now just in case anyone is unfamiliar with the rule, here's a brief explanation: 

   

The pitch clock allows for 15 seconds between pitches with no runners on base and 20 seconds with baserunners, and limits against how often a pitcher may step off the rubber. A ball will be called against a pitcher who takes longer than the allowed time, and a strike against any "offending" batter who takes "too long" to get himself ready. MLB also limited pitchers to two pickoff attempts per batter (or three if he succeeds the third time), with any violations counted as a balk. 

The whole point of the pitch clock is to speed up the game. A pitch clock violation, once called, will slow down the game because the umpire calls time. Often I've seen pitchers starting their windup as the pitch clock reaches zero, and while the batter is preparing to hit the pitch, the ump calls time, stopping the play. The pitcher then either throws the ball, which prevents a hazard, or forcibly stops his high powered throw, which can pose a serious risk to his deceleration muscles. If the umpire had waited one more second and let the pitch continue, it would have saved ten or fifteen seconds (and in rare cases, helped prevent an injury). In a perfect world there would be no pitch clock. 

The penalty for a pitch clock violation committed by the pitcher is an automatic ball. One pitch changes the dynamic of an at bat, which could affect the dynamic of an inning, which could decide the outcome of a game. While calling time out for a pitch clock violation is stupidly time inefficient, let's assume for some reason that there must be a pitch clock. Fine. Instead of an automatic ball, let's make the penalty a $1,000 fine. That way, the game wouldn't be tainted by artificial means. The fine could be effective because MLB players hate salary cuts, even if they don't need the extra money. Just seeing the money coming out of their check really ticks them off. And if a $1,000 fine seems insignificant, just imagine you getting fined $1,000 at work for taking one extra second to do a particular task. 

This would be a good solution. I should be the commissioner. 

The Pitching Staff That Always Walks Batters

Luke Walker 

Jerry Walker 

Neil Walker 

Bob Walk

Jamie Walker 

Michael Wacha (If you're from Boston) 

Taijuan Walker 

Walker Buehler 

Michael Kopech 

A Word On Stealing Signs

    Sign stealing is a natural part of baseball. If a player figures out the other team's signs, even if he has to look for them, that is an advantage not unfairly won. There is a reason why changing signs and giving them subtly is practiced and taught from little league to the MLB. Many players who were adept at stealing signs simply by observing the other team repeatedly give them in a game provide a huge advantage to their teams, which can be ready whenever the opposing team wants to steal, or throw a breaking ball, or bunt. However, there are legal limitations on what can or cannot be done in order to steal a sign. If a runner on second base notices that the catcher gives a sign without concealing it properly, it is his right - nay, his responsibility - to relay that information to his team. Okay, so if this is part of the game, then what's the big deal about the Astros and Red Sox electronically stealing signs (and championships) a few years ago? In 1961, the National League banned the use of a "mechanical device" in order to obtain and / or relay signs. 40 years later, in 2001, MLB issued a memorandum banning the use of any kind of electronic device in order to communicate with each other during a game (especially for stealing signs). The Astros and Red Sox used cameras in their stadium in order to find, decipher, and relay signs to their batters. While this is in obvious disregard for the league's previous two memos, it's also against common sense. No team should use their own unique devices in order to steal signs. It's an unfair advantage that can be only used by the home team. Memo or no memo, this was clearly unacceptable. That said, I don't think any participating member of the Houston Astros or the Boston Red Sox during the scandal should be admitted to the Hall of Fame. 

https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2023/02/21/mookie-betts-everybody-was-aware-2018-red-sox-stole-signs/11316385002/ 

My Comments On Range Factor

    Range factor is a statistic that attempts to estimate a player's range in the field. There are two formulas for range factor: range factor per nine innings, 9 x (putouts + assists) / innings played; and range factor per game, (putouts + assists) / games played. While this is a useful statistic, it isn't foolproof, and probably a little overhyped. Let's see why. 

    Whenever I evaluate a player's defense, I usually check his range factor and see, in general, what that number looks like. However, I don't use it as an end all statistic like many people do, for a seemingly obvious reason. How can you blame your fielder for not making the play on a ball that was not hit to him? I know that range factor was designed to estimate how many hits above average a fielder saves on balls hit near him, but if they weren't hit to him, they're still counted the same. Nowadays range factors as a whole are at an all time low on account of higher strikeout rates, and this should be noted. As long as the player makes the play whenever the ball is hit to him, he's doing his job. Thus, a player with a slightly low range factor but a high fielding percentage can still provide much value to his team simply by making the play. 

    Obviously, if the difference between the player's range factor and the league average range factor at his position is significant enough, I will take it into consideration. Ozzie Smith didn't make 0.4 more plays per game than the average shortstop by accident. However, if the difference is small enough, it could just be a product of opponents simply not hitting the ball to shortstop. A more efficient way to measure a player's range would be to score hits based on where the ball ended up. I think that whenever a team records a base hit, it should be scored on the nearest fielder (for example, a single up the middle would be "1B-8"). Even if the fielder doesn't make an error, this helps indicate how good his range is. If the centerfielder is playing deep and all those singles are killing you, the manager knows that he needs to make a change. Even if the centerfielder doesn't make many errors, or if there are unusually many balls hit to him (by coincidence), this kind of statistic could meaningfully compliment range factor and fielding percentage. By counting a player's defensive "hits allowed" and combining them with his plays (and errors; balls hit his direction that he reaches), we could come to a more comprehensive view of his efficiency in the field (because a "hit allowed" has the same net effect as an error). This could account for range and fielding percentage while wiping out coincidences. 

Tommy John Surgery

Sometimes I wonder... how much Hall of Fame consideration should be given to those who get Tommy John Surgery? The operation has drastically extended many careers, particularly among pitchers, and I wonder how much that weighs under the playing ability criterion in the Hall of Fame's own voting requirements. For example, Mel Parnell ended his career at age 34 because of arm troubles. Still a productive pitcher (he had a 123 ERA+ and a no-hitter in his final season), there was still much life in that arm, if only he could have tapped into it. He could have been a Hall of Famer, but at the time he didn't have the technology to prolong his career. On the other hand, John Smoltz got Tommy John Surgery in 2000. At 32, he had had a productive career to that point (157 wins, 2,098 strikeouts), but didn't make his case for Cooperstown until after the surgery. After the procedure, Smoltz pitched for nine more seasons, passed the 200 win and 3,000 strikeout milestones, and made four all-star teams. He was elected to the Hall of Fame in 2015. If Smoltz had pitched in Parnell's era, he wouldn't be considered for the Hall of Fame, but if Parnell had pitched in Smoltz's era, there is a good chance that he'd have a plaque today. It's just something to think about. 

WHY I THINK KENNY LOFTON SHOULD BE IN COOPERSTOWN

WHY I THINK KENNY LOFTON SHOULD BE IN COOPERSTOWN 

By- Damien 

Kenny Lofton was one of many stars unfortunate to play during the steroid era. Not only was he facing stiff competition, considering all the juiced pitchers he had to bat against, he also had to compete with guys like Barry Bonds and Sammy Sosa for fame and good press. At a time when steroid eaters were constantly in the headlines for their Ruthian home run feats, guys like Lofton, who played the more traditional, speedier version of the game, were often brushed under the rug. Lofton didn’t have remarkable power (he had 130 career home runs), but he still produced a ton of runs, scoring over 100 of them in six different seasons and posting six additional seasons with 90 or more. Lofton was best known for his speed, which helped him lead the AL in stolen bases five years in a row from 1992 through 1996 on his way to a career total of 622. On the defensive side, his speed helped him to incredible range in centerfield, covering more ground than nearly everyone else in the league. 

Kenneth Lofton was born on May 31, 1967. As a youth he played both baseball and basketball, and excelled at both. Lofton received a scholarship to the University of Arizona as a basketball player, but also began to build a reputation as a base thief for the baseball team. Lofton played basketball all throughout college, but turned full time to baseball as a pro. He played three years in the Astros’ farm system, and made his MLB debut on September 14, 1991, collecting a double, two singles, a walk, and three runs scored. He was traded to the Cleveland Indians in the offseason for little return, and immediately made an impact for his new team, batting .285 and leading the AL in stolen bases en route to a second place finish in the Rookie of the Year voting. Proving he was no fluke, he topped the league in steals again in 1993 and upped his batting average to .325. 

Lofton was a key member of the successful Indians teams of the late 1990’s, leading the team to three postseasons and one pennant from 1995 to 1999. Even in the one season he missed, 1997, when he was with the Atlanta Braves, he was instrumental in the Tribe’s success. Just before the start of the 1997 season, Lofton was traded to the Braves for David Justice and Marquis Grissom. While Lofton was busy hitting .333 for the Braves and leading them through the NL playoffs, Justice and Grissom were playing very well for the Indians, and were instrumental in leading them to the World Series. Then, on December 8, Lofton signed as a free agent for the Indians, returning to Cleveland in less than nine months, and helped them to the playoffs three more times. 

Lofton’s 2001 season wasn’t among his best, and he was granted free agency after the season. He began the 2002 season with the White Sox, but was traded to the Giants at the deadline. Lofton played well for the Giants down the stretch, helping them reach the playoffs, and batted .292 with six stolen bases in three rounds of postseason action. He again saw time with multiple teams the following year, and turned in another productive season. As Lofton aged, more teams seemingly gave up on him, but the more he produced at the Big League level, the more interest he got from different clubs around the league. In total, he played for eleven different MLB teams, not counting his three stints as an Indian. After posting an .811 OPS for Philadelphia in 2005, he was offered a deal with the Dodgers, where he enjoyed near everyday playing time. At 39, most observers probably didn’t expect the strong season he would have in 2006, as he batted .301 with 32 stolen bases in 129 games. Lofton’s final season was 2007, which he began with the Texas Rangers, where he batted .303 with 21 steals in the first half before being traded to the Indians at the deadline. He had a rewarding final season, retiring in his most recognizable jersey after playing in his 20th different playoff series. 

When you think about the best players of the 1990’s, Lofton’s name is seldom mentioned, but not for lack of talent. While his .299 / .372 / .423 slash line (.794 OPS) is solid, it amounts to only a 107 OPS+, a testament to the era in which he played. If not for the Bondses and the Cansecos and the A-Rods, who routinely posted seasonal OPS figures around 1.000, thanks purely to their, uh, special help, Lofton’s OPS+ would appear much more respectable, perhaps 120 or higher. He was also a great bunter, a skill widely underappreciated in this day and age. While Lofton was good with the bat, it was not what he was best known for. He was a terror on the bases, swiping 622 bags in his career (15th most of all time, including pre-1898 figures), and had six individual seasons with at least 54. Lofton’s baserunning skill was not demonstrated solely in his eye popping stolen base totals, however, as he took extra bases on a hit about 55% of the time across his career, compared to the league average of 42%. His running helped him to 1,528 runs scored, including as many as 132 in 1996, and an average of 118 runs scored per 162 games across his career. Lofton was also arguably the best defensive centerfielder of his era, leading in assists four times and double plays twice (showing off an above average arm in addition to his range), taking home four Gold Glove awards. Finally, Lofton was a catalyst in many great postseason teams. He was the leadoff man for the 1995 Cleveland Indians, widely considered one of the greatest teams of all time by historians. In total, he led six different teams to eleven postseasons (20 series) during his 17 year MLB career, playing in a total of 95 career playoff games, ninth on the all time list. Only once every three years did Lofton’s team fail to make the postseason. All this adds up to a strong Hall of Fame case. At a quick glance Lofton’s numbers aren’t overwhelming, but on looking just a little bit closer, he comes out a pretty darn good candidate. 

LIFETIME STATISTICS 

Games career: 2,103 season high: 154 in 1996 and 1998 

At Bats career: 8,120 season high: 662 in 1996 led AL: 662 in 1996 

Hits career: 2,428 season high: 210 in 1996 led AL: 160 in 1994 

Doubles career: 383 season high: 35 in 1996 

Triples career: 116 season high: 13 in 1995 led AL: 13 in 1995 

Home Runs career: 130 season high: 15 in 2000 

Runs Scored career: 1,528 season high: 132 in 1996 

Runs Batted In career: 781 season high: 73 in 2000 

Stolen Bases career: 622 season high: 75 in 1996 led AL: 66 in 1992, 70 in 1993, 60 in 1994, 54 in 1995, 75 in 1996 

Walks career: 945 season high: 87 in 1998 

Strikeouts career: 1,016 season high: 84 in 1999 

Batting Average career: .299 season high: .349 in 1994 

On Base Percentage career: .372 season high: .412 in 1994 

Slugging Percentage career: .423 season high: .536 in 1994 

Total Bases career: 3,433 season high: 295 in 1996 

Sacrifice Hits career: 72 season high: 7 in 1996 and 2003 

Fielding Percentage career: .984 season high: 1.000 in 2002 

Double Plays career: 35 season high: 4 in 1998, 2004, and 2007 led AL CF: 3 in 1994, 4 in 1998 led AL OF: 4 in 2004 (find a way to explain this without adding the also played section) 

Putouts career: 4,856 season high: 420 in 1992 

Assists career: 142 season high: 19 in 1998 led AL CF: 14 in 1992, 13 in 1994, 11 in 1995, 19 in 1998 led AL OF: 13 in 1994, 19 in 1998 

DID YOU KNOW? 

-finished fourth in the AL MVP Award voting in 1994, 11th in 1996, 15th in 1993, and finished 26th in the NL MVP voting in 1997 

-batted .357 with five stolen bases in six all-star games (1994 - 1999) 

-his 66 stolen bases in 1992 set a new AL rookie record 

-holds Cleveland Indians franchise records for both career stolen bases (452) and stolen bases in a single season (75 in 1996) 

-stole more bases in postseason play than anyone else in MLB history (34) 

-played in the postseason with more teams than any other player 

-led the AL in singles in 1993 (148) and 1994 (107)

-tied an AL record by scoring a run in 18 consecutive games in 2000 

-stole an Indians record five stolen bases in one game on September 3, 2000, and later won the game in the 13th inning with a walk off home run 

-had a 26 game hitting streak from April 29 through May 30, 2003 

-was inducted into the Cleveland Indians Hall of Fame in 2010 

https://www.sports-reference.com/cbb/players/ken-lofton-1.html